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The Tinker decision may cause school officials to be unsure of the limits
of their authority to prevent disruption. Indeed, it may cause such officials
to be unsure as to what constitutes disruption. The Court has clearly held
that disruption of school activities is not protected by the first amendment
and may be curtailed, but has not adequately defined disruption. Although
physical disruption of school activities is clearly subject to prohibition,"
mere controversy is not. However, it is possible that situations might occur
in which controversy could "materially and substantially" interfere with
the operation of a school.
Another result of the Tinker decision may be that school officials in the
future will have their administrative decisions subjected to judicial hind-
sight, to be upheld or overruled on the basis of the facts of the specific
case. As in Burnside and Blackwell, the courts in future cases are likely
to look to the degree of disruption which occurred after the regulation
was violated, rather than to the reasonableness of the fears of the school
officials that disruption would result. Although the Court has clearly
affirmed the constitutional rights of students in the public schools, the
lack of clarity as to the circumstances in which the right of free expres-
sion may be curtailed diminishes the effect of the case. Because school of-
ficials may be uncertain as to the legality of their acts, and as to the limits
of their authority, they will probably continue to act as they have in the
past, leaving the determination of validity to the courts.
Samuel H. Ballis
Higher Punishment for a Successful Appellant on Retrial:
Defining the Gantlet
Pearce was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape and given a
twelve- to fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the decision was reversed be-
cause an involuntary confession had been used against him.' On retrial, he
was again found guilty. Although credit was given for time already served
under the first conviction, his new sentence, added to that time, was longer
than the original sentence. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the federal district court, finding the new sentence
unconstitutional and void The Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
from their classwork was disruptive in itself. He also expressed the opinion that the first amend-
ment does not extend the right to address any group at any public place, at any time. He also stated
that he felt the Court was returning to a "reasonableness" test for striking down acts of state
governments. Id. at 517-19.
a See Mr. Justice Fortas' concurring statement denying certiorari in Barker v. Hardway, 394
U.S. 905 (1969).
'State v. Pearce, 266 N.C. 234, 145 S.E.2d 918 (1965).
'Pearce v. North Carolina, 397 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1968). The court relied on its former de-
cision in Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905
(1968). There the Fourth Circuit held thzt the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is violated if an increased sentence is permitted on retrial to a defendant who had served time on
an invalid sentence. Patton v. North Carolina, supra at 643.
' North Carolina v. Pearce, 393 U.S. 922 (1969).
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The Court also granted certiorari in a similar case from the Fifth Cir-
cuit. In this case Rice, the appellant, had been convicted of burglary and
sentenced to ten years. His conviction was reversed on appeal because he
had been denied right to counsel. On retrial, two and one-half years after
the first conviction, he was again found guilty. However, he was assessed
twenty-five years, and no credit was given for time already served. The
federal district court overturned his new sentence because it was evident
that he was being punished for appealing; the court of appeals affirmed.'
The Supreme Court decided both cases in the same opinion. Held,
affirmed: Assessment of a higher punishment on retrial for the same of-
fense after a successful appeal is not prohibited by the double jeopardy pro-
vision of the fifth amendment as long as punishment already exacted has
been fully credited. However, to satisfy the requirements of due process
of law, it must affirmatively appear on the record that the higher sentence
is based on identifiable conduct since the original sentencing, not on vin-
dictiveness. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).'
I. THE BASIC PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Even an erroneous and illegal sentence could not be corrected by a new
trial under English common law.' This may have been what caused the
founding fathers to change Madison's first proposal for a double jeopardy
provision in the Constitution. Madison's proposal was that "[n]o person
shall be subject ... to more than one punishment or one trial for the same
offense."' It was changed to read, as it does today, to "nor shall any per-
son be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb."' The double jeopardy protection prevents governmental appeal'
and multiple punishments for the same offense,"° but it does not prevent
retrial of a defendant whose conviction is reversed on appeal."
In 1900 the Supreme Court affirmed a decision which gave an appellant
a more severe sentence on retrial than he had received in the trial from
which he had first appealed.'" The Court rejected the argument that to
resentence the appellant at all would place him in double jeopardy and
4 Rice v. Simpson, 274 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff'd, 396 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
5 Decided with Simpson v. Rice. Although Pearce was given credit, no reasons were given for the
higher sentence. Simpson was not given credit, nor did the record reveal a lack of vindictiveness
behind the higher sentence.
6 Whalen, Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 35
MINN. L. REv. 239, 244 (1951), citing Whitehead v. Queen, 7 Q.B. 582, 115 Eng. Rep. 608
(1845); King v. Bourne, 7 A. & E. 58, 712 Eng. Rep. 393 (K.B. 1837); King v. Ellis, 5 B. & C.
395, 400, 108 Eng. Rep. 147, 151 (K.B. 1826).
'North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 729 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring), citing 1 AN-
NALS OF CONGRESS 434 (1834) [1789-91].
S U.S. CONST. amend. V.
SKepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). This prohibition was a protection from the
federal government, since this provision did not apply to the states until recently. See Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Since states now must follow the standard set by the Supreme
Court, it would follow that states are no longer allowed to appeal a criminal case.
l"Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
"United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
"Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900).
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violate due process.13 The Court later held in Stroud v. United States4 that
the reversal of a defendant's conviction for first degree murder and sen-
tence to life imprisonment did not constitutionally bar a conviction on re-
trial for first degree murder with the death sentence."5
The constitutional authority for the retrial and resentencing of a de-
fendant is not without limitation, however. In Green v. United States' a
defendant was convicted of second degree murder under an indictment
charging first degree murder. After the conviction for the lesser offense was
reversed on appeal, the defendant was tried and convicted for the higher
offense. The Supreme Court held the second conviction unconstitutional
because conviction for the lesser offense operated as an implied acquittal of
the higher crime.' To hold otherwise, the Court said, would place the
defendant in the dilemma of going to prison on a possibly erroneous con-
viction or risk being found guilty of the greater offense on retrial "in plain
conflict with the constitutional bar against double jeopardy."' "
II. BENTON V. MARYLAND: DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION APPLICABLE
TO THE STATES
Recently, in Benton v. Maryland,9 the Supreme Court held the fifth
amendment protection against double jeopardy to be fundamental to the
American scheme of justice and applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment." In doing so it overruled Palko v. Connecticut" which
held that state defendants were not protected by the double jeopardy pro-
vision as long as an examination of the totality of circumstances did not
disclose a denial of fundamental fairness and due process of law." Benton
was found not guilty of larceny but guilty of burglary under an indict-
ment charging both. He was given a ten-year prison sentence. On retrial,
after reversal of the burglary conviction, he moved to dismiss the larceny
count, claiming that it subjected him to double jeopardy. The motion was
denied, and he was found guilty on both counts and given concurrent
sentences of fifteen years for burglary and five years for larceny. The Su-
preme Court held that the larceny conviction was unconstitutional under
the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment. In so holding, the
Court relied on the Green' decision.
The Court's decision in Benton appears to be important for more than
"8The Court answered that his plea could not be maintained because of service of part of a
sentence vacated on his own application. He was held to abide by the consequences of his appeal.
Id. at 158.
14251 U.S. 15 (1919).
"' Id. Again the Court said the defendant was not placed in double jeopardy, because the award
of a new trial was granted as a result of his writ of error. Id. at 18.
"355 U.S. 184 (1957).
17Id. at 185.
a8Id. at 194.
1939; U.S. 784 (1969).
2Id. at 794.
2 3 0 2 U.S. 319 (1937).
22 id.
'Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969).4 Id. at 797, citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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its extension of double jeopardy protection to state defendants. The
Court's reliance upon Green would seem to indicate that double jeopardy
protection does not extend to a more severe sentence imposed upon a de-
fendant at retrial, but only to the offenses for which he may be retried.
This becomes even clearer when one considers that the offense for which
Benton could not be retried was the lesser of the two offenses."5
III. NORTH CAROLINA V. PEARCE
The Court's Opinion. In North Carolina v. Pearce the Court quickly re-
solved the question of whether credit for time served under the original
sentence must be credited toward the sentence given on retrial.' How-
ever, the question of whether the double jeopardy provision of the fifth
amendment prohibits higher punishment for the same offense on retrial
after reversal was not so easily answered. The Court first cited United
States v. Ball," which held that double jeopardy does not prohibit retrial
after a successful reversal. The Court also cited Stroud"5 and Murphy v.
Massachusetts"5 in support of the proposition that a defendant may receive
a higher sentence on retrial."' Ultimately, however, the Court based its
holding on the theory that "the slate is wiped clean" by reversal of the
original conviction." In so deciding, the Court dismissed the contention
that the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause precludes higher
punishment after appeal. The argument was advanced that permitting
higher punishment on retrial imposes risk only on convicts who appeal,
thus putting them in a class separate from those who do not appeal. The
Court reasoned that because the retrial could also result in an acquittal,
it could not be said that an invidious classification had been created."' How-
25 His sentence on retrial for larceny was five years, and for burglary, fifteen. In Green the de-
fendant could not be tried for the higher offense of which he was impliedly acquitted. What of
the defendant who is convicted of voluntary manslaughter on a murder indictment, has his con-
viction reversed, is retired on the murder indictment, and again convicted of voluntary man-
slaughter? If the rationale behind the Green and Benton decisions is followed will his second con-
viction be overturned because he was impliedly acquitted of murder at his first trial, thus making
his second conviction invalid because of a faulty indictment? Will it make a difference that he
was sentenced to ten-to-fifteen years the first time and ten years the second time? What effect
Ben ton v. Maryland has on this set of facts, and whether Benton is retroactive will be argued
before the Supreme Court in Price v. Georgia, 118 Ga. App. 207, 163 S.E.2d 243 (1968), cert.
granted, 395 U.S. 975 (1969).
2 Citing Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), the Court emphasized that the fifth
amendment guarantee against double jeopardy protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense. This protection, the Court reasoned, "is what is necessarily implicated in any consideration
of the question whether, in the imposition of sentence for the same offense after retrial, the Con-
stitution requires that credit must be given for punishment already endured." North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
2"163 U.S. 662 (1896).25 id.
21 Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
30177 U.S. 155 (1900).
a1 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-20 (1969).
32 Id. at 720-21. "A trial judge is not constitutionally precluded, in other words, from imposing
a new sentence, whether greater or less than the original sentence, in light of events subsequent
to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the defendant's 'life, health, habits, con-
duct, and mental propensities'." Id. at 723, citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1948).
as 395 U.S. at 722-23. But it could be argued: Two men are in prison for the same offense;
both misbehave enough so as to have, for example, their paroles cancelled or set back. Only the
one who appeals may have his sentence increased.
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ever, it was found that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
does prohibit putting a price on appeal by penalizing those who exercise
their right to appeal. The Court held that due process requires the produc-
tion of records showing reasons for higher punishment, based on "objective
information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding."'
Use of Precedent Questionable. Despite the Court's reliance on its decisions
in Ball, Murphy and Stroud, one may question whether these cases support
the principle that higher punishment on retrial after a successful appeal is
constitutionally permissible. It is well accepted that Ball stood for no more
than allowing retrial after reversal." In Murphy the defendant's double
jeopardy claim was that he could not be resentenced after he had served
part of his original sentence." Furthermore, double jeopardy protection
did not apply to state proceedings when Murphy was decided in 1900. The
facts and rationale in Stroud are closest to Pearce, but it is not clear whe-
ther the specific issue of higher punishment on retrial was argued, or
whether the case was argued on the theory that retrial on indictment for
the same crime was placing Stroud in double jeopardy. 7 However, the
argument that Green overturns Stroud can be answered by distinguishing
Stroud, as did the Court in the Green decision. Green involved two statu-
tory offenses, and of one he was acquitted; Stroud involved only one."
Defining the Gantlet. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in
Pearce, observed that the theory behind the double jeopardy protection is
that a defendant "need run the gantlet only once."3 Pearce, seen in Ben-
ton's light, defines that gantlet. The gantlet is not the risk of the range of
punishment, but the risk of conviction. Once a person has been acquitted
or fairly convicted of a particular statutory offense, he cannot be tried
again for it. If he wins an appeal, he can be tried again; he has not run the
full gantlet to a fair and final judgment as to guilt or innocence. Double
jeopardy protects him from multiple punishment for the same conviction
only in requiring credit to be given for time already served. His only other
sentencing protection comes from the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Due process guarantees that any increased sentence will not
be imposed as punishment for exercising the right of appeal."0
34 Id. at 723-26.
'The Pearce Court accepts this. Id. at 719-20.
" Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900). That case involved only the right to re-
sentence at all after a part of the original sentence had been served. There was no new trial as
to guilt or innocence. See notes 12-13 supra, and accompanying text.
"
7North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 732 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
8Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 194-95 n.14 (1957).
3 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 727 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas,
however, defines the gantlet as the risk of the full range of punishment, not merely the risk of
conviction of a specific statutory offense.
4 In some cases it may be worse for an appellant to be in prison in one state than in another.
For example, a defendant in a state in which first and second degree murder are different statutory
crimes with different punishments receives greater protection than one in a state where murder is
but one statutory offense with a range of punishment. Under Pearce, the latter takes the risk of
receiving the death penalty on appealing his murder conviction and life imprisonment sentence.
The former, under Benton and Green, takes no such risk appealing his second degree murder con-
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Once one recognizes the distinction between conviction and punish-
ment, the constitutional permissibility of higher punishment on retrial
becomes clear. However, a problem still remains in explaining the reason-
ing behind the separation. The language of the Court is of little help. The
Court ventured an explanation in terms of precedent,41 but as has been
shown, it is questionable that the issue had been before the Court until
Pearce." Ultimately the decision was based on the slate having been wiped
clean by the successful appeal,4 but the Court admitted that that meta-
phor only verbalizes the unexplained."
IV. CONCLUSION
In Pearce the Court implicitly acknowledged a distinction between pun-
ishment and conviction. The decision makes clear that, except for the
credit requirement, only the latter falls under the double jeopardy pro-
tection. The significance of Pearce lies in the effect which the decision will
have rather than in the Court's rationale. The Court's decision could have
been based on the long history of the separation of conviction from pun-
ishment, dating back to the early common law.' Balancing of equities
between state and defendant' and deferring to the state's prerogative of
enacting penal legislation and establishing sentencing procedure" also
present plausible rationale for the separation. However, the Court de-
clined to rest its decision on any of these bases, relying instead on question-
able judicial precedent and the unpersuasive theory that the "slate is
wiped clean" by the prosecution of a successful appeal.
Neither do the due process requirements laid down by the Court in
Pearce seem to rest on an ascertainable constitutional base. They seem to
stem more from the Court's theory of penology than from standards re-
quired by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Modern
penology does follow the theory that a defendant's character be consid-
ered when imposing a sentence. Although conduct subsequent to the orig-
inal sentencing proceeding is a part of the defendant's character, it is not
clear that on retrial due process requires consideration of only this con-
duct, to the exclusion of an opinion as to the degree of blameworthiness for
viction and life imprisonment sentence. He has been impliedly acquitted of first degree murder;
he may not receive the death sentence on retrial because that sentence in that state applies only to
first degree murder. One must take the risk; the other need not. Both have committed the same
wrong against society.
41North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-20 (1969).
"See notes 35-37 supra, and accompanying text.
"North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969).
4Id.
4 For a history of the separation of conviction from sentencing, and double jeopardy as a term
of art, see Steele, The Doctrine of Multiple Prosecutions in Texas, 22 Sw. L.J. 567 (1968).
"The argument usually goes something like this: "If the defendant has a chance to correct
the verdict as to his guilt or innocence, with the chance he may be set free, why should not the
state be able to correct any mistake in sentencing?" Cf. Whalen, Resentence Without Credit for
Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 35 MrNN. L. REv. 239, 245 (1951): "Is there any
rational justification for punishing this defendant substantially more than others who committed
the same offense, simply because this defendant was not given a fair trial or was not properly sen-
tenced the first time?"
47 Sentencing is a police power left to the states under the tenth amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
[Vol. 23
